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When Roberto Escalante* chose to undertake research among henequen 
producers in Yucatan, he was already aware that the Mexican state would be 
difficult to research, perhaps even more difficult than simple commodity 
production. Debate among Mexican social scientists interested in 'the agra-
rian question' was often as heated and polemical as it was thin empirically. 
Interpretation of the Mexican campesino's demise was not simply a matter 
for research: it was already a deeply ideological issue, which divided 
academic departments and fuelled personal and professional rivalries. On 
the one side stood the Neo-Populists (campesinistas) such as Gustavo Esteva 
and Arturo Warman, and on the other side 'unrepentant' Marxists like 
Louisa Pare and Roger Bartra. The 'truth' might lie with both parties, with 
neither party or somewhere in between, but the way the argument was con-
ducted rarely led one to believe this. Escalante chose to look at henequen 
producers in Yucatan partly because his family's roots were there, but also 
because he became intrigued with the confusions surrounding the empirical 
evidence for and against rural proletarianisation. 
The Mexican state was every bit as problematic an area. Invoking the Mex-
ican state had become common in contemporary social science, but not 
much research was conducted into the state itself. The state was often a flex-
ible category which could be expanded or contracted to suit convenience. 
The interstices of the state, the real (rather than imagined) effects of state 
patronage; these important concerns were frequently ignored, just as the 
rhetorical use to which the 'state' could be put proved almost limitless. 
Escalante's thesis argues that the divisions within the body of the state are 
as important, in many ways, as the role of the state in monolithic form. He 
also suggests that the Mexican state's involvement in the country's economic 
periphery was prompted, in the case of Yucatan, not so much by the desire 
to appropriate and realise a surplus, as by the need to placate opposition and 
ensure political conformity. From the standpoint of henequen 'peasant' 
households the state did not appear monolithic or (except rarely and untyp-
ically) coercive. The state provided the means to ensure survival, through 
systems of agricultural credit, and facilitated the social reproduction of the 
household. Familiar categories within the discussion of Latin America agra-
rian formations, notably the connections between household production 
and collective agriculture, can thus be seen as specific accommodation to 
potentially conflicting structures. 
For its part the Mexican state in Yucatan was led into more 'dependent' 
relations with campesino groups, in which one can question which party was 
more dependent: the state or the peasantry. As Escalante puts it: 
Instead of scrapping marginally inefficient areas of henequen cultivation and con-
centrating on more productive areas, improving agricultural techniques, and 
above all, letting ejidatarios face market conditions by themselves, a protective cur-
tain of public investment was built up. 
This paper helps to explain how this situation came about. 
Michael Redclift 
Environment Division, Wye College and 
Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London. 
* Roberto Escalante's University of London PhD thesis on T h e Mexican 
State and the Household Economy: the Case of the Henequen Industry in 
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Introduction 
For more than a century the henequen industry has been the main economic 
activity of the South-Eastern State of Yucatan in Mexico. Its economic his-
tory throughout its development has been largely determined by two factors: 
first the alternation of economic booms and crises as a result of its perennial 
dependence on uncontrolled external markets, and second, the role played 
by capital (private and public). 
Recurrent economic crisis has always characterised the history of the 
henequen industry. After the Revolution in 1910, and suppression of the 
movement for independence financed by Yucatecan hacendados, the Mexi-
can state initiated a process of penetration and control of the henequen 
industry. Since the 1920s different approaches have been experimented with, 
from state ownership to indirect control via financial provision to producers, 
from the control of the agricultural side of the activity to control of the 
industrial process. 
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the characteristics of state inter-
vention in the henequen industry and the economic strategies that the dif-
ferent types of henequen growers (eg., ejidatarios, parcelarios, etc.) have 
developed as a response to such intervention. From the beginning of the 
1960s, the henequen industry began a steady process of economic decline 
provoked by the introduction of synthetic substitutes in the hard-fibre mar-
ket, and by the increasing inefficiency of henequen growers in the produc-
tion of fibre. By looking at the effects that state intervention has had upon 
the henequen growers which it financed, it is demonstrated that the capital 
inflows provided by the State to the non-economically viable henequen 
industry have become a means of maintaining and reproducing the house-
hold economy. 
The relationship between the Federal Government and Yucatan's hene-
quen industry in the period 1955-1980 was characterised by the combination 
of the following empirical trends: 
a) a steady decline in henequen output and productivity ; 
b) a sharp downward trend in export-prices for henequen raw-fibre and its 
manufactured by-products (ie., harvest-twine, baler twine, cables, ropes, 
sacks, etc.); 
c) increased state involvement in the agricultural sector of the industry (i) 
via the so-called Vertical Concentration of Producers, and (ii) by Federal 
Government take-over of the industrial sector of the industry through 
nationalisation of the private Yucatecan cordage industry; 
d) the replacement of economic criteria by political considerations in so 
far as the participation of Federal Government agencies (ie., the Bank, 
and Cordemex) in the henequen industry was concerned;1 
e) the founding of Cordemex in 1964. From that year the control of the 
Federal Government over the henequen industry was complete. To the 
control exercised by the Bank in the agricultural sphere was added Cor-
demex's control of the industrial side. 
Among those scholars (Menendez, 1981; Rubio and Villanueva, 1979; 
Brannon, 1980) who have analysed the case of the henequen industry, and its 
relationship with the Federal government in the period 1960-1980, the pre-
vailing view is that the latter has in practice proletarianised henequen 
ejidatarios. As Brannon puts it, "ejidatarios have come to consider them-
selves employees of the Federal Government and consider their credit 
advances as wages to which they are entitled".2 
The arguments suggesting the proletarianisation process among the hene-
quen peasantry vary. Menendez (1981), for example, through his theory of 
"double dependency" argues that, apart from dependency on the external 
market, to which the henequen activity has been linked ever since its initial 
development in the second half of the last century, there has also developed 
an internal dependency on the Mexican Federal Government after Car-
denas's agrarian reform in 1937. 
On the one hand, external dependency produces the effect of transferring 
surplus value from internal producers to foreign buyers, since unequal 
exchange via prices is established in favour of the latter. The proletarianisa-
tion of the peasantry is enforced by external dependency through the con-
stant de-capitalisation of producers by the unequal exchange mechanism 
already referred to. 
On the other hand the second kind of dependency, internal dependency, 
has been created by the Federal Government's take-over of what Menendez 
calls "the most dynamic economic activity in Yucatan" (i.e., the henequen 
industry). Through its agencies, according to the author, the government has 
brought about the proletarianisation of peasants via the provision of credit. 
The two kinds of dependency seem somehow to become confused when 
Menendez argues that due to the fact that export-revenues are not enough 
to cover internal costs, proletarians controlled by the Federal Government 
have to be subsidised. In Menendez's view, the proletarianised peasants can-
not produce surplus value for their employer, but rather have to be assisted, 
with surplus value produced from somewhere else. 
A similar view is held by Rubio and Villanueva. However, unlike Menen-
dez, they do not pay attention to external factors. Rubio and Villanueva put 
more emphasis on internal factors (i.e., the provision of credit) as the source 
of the poletarianisation of henequen peasants. The State's agencies (espe-
cially the Bank) according to the authors, are entrepreneurs which not only 
control the production process, but also do not pay their employees (i.e. 
henequen growers) the total value of their output. The extraction of surplus 
value is then assumed to exist. Paradoxically enough, as I shall discuss in 
detail below, from 1955 to 1980 increasing subsidies have been paid by the 
State's agencies in the henequen industry to ejido growers. 
Although of neoclassical persuasion, Brannon has also put forward the 
view that ejido henequen growers have become proletarians because of Fed-
eral Government intervention in the industry. Unlike Menendez, and Rubio 
and Villanueva, his main concern is to demonstrate that because of the polit-
ical need to maintain stability in Yucatan, political criteria throughout the 
1960s and 1970s have prevailed over economic considerations, as far as allo-
cation of resources is concerned. Brannon himself gives a detailed account 
of the increasing discrepancy between the economic needs of ejidatarios (ful-
filled by the Federal Government), and those of the henequen industry (i.e., 
profits, productivity, etc.). The author stresses this as he points out that in 
pursuit of non-economic objectives in Yucatan the Federal Government 
either lost, or relinquished, economic control of the ejidos? If the pro-
letarianisation theory has anything to do with the need of any entrepreneur 
to have economic control over his labour force, and thereby accumulate cap-
ital (surplus value), then it is difficult to maintain Brannon's view, particu-
larly when the situation, as he recognises, points to the contrary. 
Although aspects of the author's views mentioned above (e.g., the pre-
dominance of political over economic needs) may be useful to explain the 
relationships between the Federal Government and Yucatan's henequen 
industry in the period 1960-1980, there are also several major difficulties. 
It is necessary to point out three important criticisms. First, the pro-
letarianisation 'theory' of the ejido henequen peasantry seems to be inconsist-
ent, at least as it is posed by these authors, since, as they themselves recog-
nise, the so-called proletarians have been increasingly subsidised by their 
employer (the Bank). As far as Marxist theory of the proletarianisation of 
labour is concerned, proletarians, if they are to be considered as such in a 
market economy, should provide a surplus value to their employers rather 
than receiving one obtained by the employer elsewhere. If, however, the 
latter is the case, then the proletarianisation theory should have to be at least 
qualified. 
Second, the authors wrongly assume that ejidatario henequen growers are 
a homogeneous social stratum. The social class differentiation created by 
government intervention is ignored. Although, for example, loan repay-
ments and income differentials, etc., are known to exist amongst ejidatarios, 
they are all assumed to be equal. The characterisation of ejidatario peasants 
as proletarians is wrongly developed by the authors, solely from the perspec-
tive of their supposed employer (i.e., the Bank) rather than from the 
analysis of 'peasants' themselves. The role, if any, of waged labour in peas-
ants' strategy to reproduce themselves is overlooked by the authors. 
Third, the authors do not pay attention to the effects that government cap-
ital inflows (i.e., investments, subsidies, etc.) have had in economically 
promoting certain strata of the peasantry. This becomes particularly import-
tant if we consider that some strata of ejidatarios, using government funds, 
have either been able to develop non-henequen activities for self-subsis-
tence or consolidate their position as henequen growers as ejidatarios and 
parcelarios at the same time, or themselves engage in henequen industrial 
activities (e.g., as workers in the defibrating mills), while still maintaining 
their status as ejidatarios and/or parcelarios.4 
Contrary to the proletarianisation hypothesis posed by the authors men-
tioned above, in this paper I shall demonstrate that the constraints imposed 
upon the Federal Government's actions by economic, political and environ-
mental conditions in the henequen industry during the period 1955-1980 
have resulted in the development of the household economy among ejido 
peasants. This household economy, however, does not encompass all hene-
quen growers, and those included adopt different levels of commoditisation 
relative to the market economy.5 
In the period analysed here (1955-1980), the State involvement in the 
henequen industry was guided more by politics than by economics. Invest-
ments were made principally to ensure political stability among henequen 
ejidatarios rather than in pursuit of economic progress. Given the fact that 
the possibilities of State modification of the economic constraints imposed 
by the henequen monocrop economy in Yucatan were severely restricted, 
economic efficiency was considered to be less important than political tran-
quility. Henequen ejidatarios, taking advantage of such political and 
economic conditions, have survived as peasants using government credit to 
that end. 
For analytical convenience, the relevant period of government interven-
tion in the henequen industry is divided into three sub-periods. The first runs 
from 1955 to 1972, in which the emphasis of Federal Government expendi-
ture focused on the further development of the henequen industry under 
government control or ownership. The second sub-period runs from 1973 to 
1976, in which the State intended to base the economic development of hene-
quen ejidos on the ejidos themselves. To achieve that end, the transforma-
tion of ejidos into agro-industrial units of production was attempted. Finally, 
the third sub-period from 1977 to 1980 analyses the most radical attempt by 
the Federal Government to break down monocrop cultivation in Yucatan, 
and most importantly, the control that ejidatarios had established over gov-
ernment expenditure in the industry.6 
1 . 1 9 5 5 - 7 2 
(a)1955-63 
The dissolution of Henequeneros de Yucatan (HedeYu - the collective 
organisation of henequen producers) in 1955 by the Federal Government 
meant the reprivatisation of land tenure and the establishment of a different 
economic policy towards the industry (Escalante, 1986). 
The real aims of the Federal Government in dismantling HedeYu are still 
not clear, and opinions on the issue are also contradictory.7 The main expla-
nation, however, is derived from political considerations. Brannon (1980) 
argues that the presence of former hacendados in top executive posts at 
HedeYu was taken by the Federal Government as a potential threat to the 
agrarian and social reforms it had carried out in Yucatan. The possible revi-
val of Yucatan's independence from the Government (as in pre-revolutio-
nary times) through HedeYu and hacendados control, had to be stopped if 
the Federal Government was to continue controlling Yucatan and its hene-
quen industry. However, the reasons alleged by the Federal Government for 
dissolving HedeYu were also of an economic nature. The steady decline in 
output and in producers' living standards, increasing corruption and mis-
management, and the need for Federal Government subsidies to support 
HedeYu were to be solved by a different strategy towards the henequen 
industry. Once HedeYu disappeared, the Bank (i.e., the Ejidal Bank) took 
control of the provision of credit to henequen growers, and their organisa-
tion for the production process. The National Bank for External Trade 
(BCE) was assigned the task of buying fibre from producers and selling it to 
overseas buyers.8 And the producers' role as entrepreneurs was to be encour-
aged by returning the control of land to them. Private producers (i.e., 
former hacendados and parcelarios) were allowed to have private control of 
their estates, and ejidos were again collectively organised, as in 1937. 
Moreover, credit societies were organised by the Bank among ejidatarios for 
the provision of credit. 
A general recovery in the industry, in the producers' income levels, and in 
the avoidance of economic losses to the Federal Government was expected 
to accompany the new approach. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, the 
opposite results came about. 
During this first sub-period, 1955-1972, the henequen industry's 
economic performance went through two different stages: recovery and 
steady decline. The Federal Government's expectations of recovery seemed 
to be justified from 1956 until 1963. During that period the average rate of 
growth for output was 2.6 percent per annum, though yields in terms of kilos 
of raw fibre per hectare declined at an average rate of 1.4 percent per annum 
(Figure 1). It is difficult to assess which producers (i.e. ejidatarios or private 
producers) were responsible for this improvement. 
Since data are given only in terms of ejidal or private production, and the 
latter is only an estimate, (as well as a large part of the so-called parcelario 
producers, both private and ejidal growers), a definite answer to this ques-
tion is difficult to provide. Estimates, however, seem to favour the 
hypothesis that private producers reacted more efficiently than ejidatarios to 
the re-privatisation process carried out in 1955. While ejidal production 
decreased at an average rate of 0.5 percent during the period, production by 
private landholders grew at 7.9 percent (Figure l).9 
There are several reasons for the differences between ejidatarios' and pri-
vate producers' differentials, relative to output and productivity growth. 
Although prices for exports during the 1950s and early 1960s were favour-
able for expanding output for all producers, they took advantage of them to 
varying degees. In the case of private producers, the rise in output was 
helped by the fact that they owned the defibrating mills.10 Their control of 
this intermediate industrial process of the industry gave them important 
economic advantages. For example, production could be lowered since the 
defibrating mills were located near the henequen fields. Transport and mana-
gerial costs could thus be kept as low as the available technology permitted. 
The ownership of defibrating plants also allowed former hacendados (the 
so-calledpequenos propietarios) to obtain extra profits, since ejidatarios and 
parcelarios had to take their leaves to be rasped at the hacendados' plants. 
Fees for removing the henequen fibre, fixed by the government, were very 
generous to plant-owners though they were lower than they had been from 
1942 through 1954, when HedeYu was functioning. These two factors, the re-
establishment from 1955 onwards of the agro-industrial unit represented by 
the hacienda though at a smaller scale than before 1937, and the ownership 
of the defibrating mills, enabled private producers, and pequenos prop-
ietarios in particular, to be profit-makers from 1956 until 1963. 1 
In the case of ejidatarios, there are different considerations if we are to 
understand their situation in the period under analysis. First of all, the 
reprivatisation process of 1955 did not solve the crucial issue of the ejidos' 
ownership of the defibrating mills. Second, the differentials among ejidos 
(i.e., the so-called wealthy ejidos compared with poor ejidos) were 
reinstated. Finally the disjuncture was re-established between the Bank's 
(i.e. Federal Government's) economic and political policies towards the 
henequen industry on the one hand, and ejidatarios' needs on the other. I 
shall now discuss these issues in detail. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the lack of control of the defibrating mills by 
ejidatarios became an obstacle to their economic development. Any gains in 
productivity achieved in the agricultural sector of the industry were in most 
cases not reflected in ejidatarios' income levels, because of the pequenos 
propietarios' monopoly over the defibrating process. Furthermore, artifi-
cally high rasping fees brought about unfavourable economic results for 
ejidatarios. The longstanding claim that the defibrating mills would come to 
Figure 1 Production of Fibre by Ejido and Private Producers: 1955-80 
Sources: Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1979); 
Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto (1982); Banrural (1981), 
Estadisticas de Henequen. 
be owned by ejidatarios, to improve their economic development and 
capitalisation, was not made by the Bank until 1962. The same thing was also 
attempted on a large scale in 1974.12 As happened in August 1937, when Car-
denas expropriated all hacienda lands and distributed them among newly 
created ejidos, no measures were taken during the re-privatisation process of 
1955 to counteract the growth of wealth differentials among ejidos. Thus 
inequality among ejidos was again in evidence, though differences were even 
greater than before. Even though little attention is given to this phenome-
non by Yucatan specialists (e.g., Brannon (1980), Menendez (1981), Mosely 
(1980)), its importance becomes paramount in explaining the Bank's policy-
making process in allocating resources, and ejidatarios' economic and politi-
cal responses to it. 
Contrary to the arguments of Brannon, and Rubio and Villanueva, the 
data show that the so-called 'poor' ejidos received more credit than the weal-
thy ones. And ejidatarios living in the poor ejidos had better political and 
economic bargaining-power than those in the wealthy ejidos. But, if the 
two issues mentioned above can partially explain ejidos' performance be-
tween 1956 and 1963, what Brannon has called the ejidatarios' market-isola-
tion phenomenon by the Bank becomes the key factor. 
The Federal Government's second take-over of the henequen industry in 
1955 was meant to build up the ejidatarios' economic viability, which had 
been eroded by HedeYu's policies. Nevertheless, the policies adopted by the 
Bank gave rise, on the one hand, to the substitution of political considera-
tions for economic criteria in the industry, and, on the other, to the develop-
ment of increasing dependency between ejidatarios and the Bank. The Fed-
eral Government thus progressively found itself, through the Bank, in a situa-
tion in which withdrawal was economically and politically unfeasible, and 
ejidatarios were increasingly able to obtain resources whose quantity and fre-
quency had nothing to do with the realities dictated by the operation of the 
market forces in which the henequen industry operated. Ejidatarios, as 
Brannon argues, were isolated from the market, and the laws governing the 
relationships between Federal Government and ejidatarios became sui 
generis in nature.14 
On the political side, the re-establishment of the Bank's control over the 
henequen industry was intended to use credit provision to buy off ejidatarios' 
political support. Thereby, ejidatarios' political behaviour could be con-
trolled by the State. 
Data on Federal Government expenditure in Yucatan, and in the hene-
quen industry in particular, are very scattered and not reliable enough to ena-
ble us to construct a long time-scale. The figures available, however, 
demonstrate that Federal Government expenditure in Yucatan's economy is 
very large. (Figure 2) 
According to Zamora Millan (1966), Federal Government expenditure 
Figure 2 Federal Government Investment in Yucatan by Economic 
Activities: 1976-80 
Source: Banrural (1981), Diagnostico Agropecuario del Estado de Yucatan 
policy in Yucatan after 1955 changed radically compared with the policy 
adopted during the first half of the fifties. In 1950 most of the Federal Gov-
ernment resources (69.98 percent of the total) were directed to the develop-
ment of communication networks, electricity and telephone services, educa-
tion, etc., while the agricultural sector only received 31.02 percent of the 
resources available.15 By 1957, the situation had been reversed so that 78.69 
percent of Federal Government money in Yucatan was spent on agricultural 
activities and only 21.31 percent was devoted to communications, health-
care, and public services in general.16 
If we take into account (Figure 2) that Yucatan's GDP is, and has been, 
largely dominated by the henequen industry's output value (including both 
its agricultural and industrial sections), and the production of maize, and 
that both activities are heavily supported via credit by Federal Government 
agencies, it is logical to conclude that most of the expenditure has been com-
sumed in these activities.17 This change in the Federal Government expendi-
ture-trend, favouring Yucatan's agricultural sector, (henequen and maize 
activities) against others (agricultural and non-agricultural activities) from 
1955 until 1978, may lead us to the conclusion that the newly-adopted role of 
the State in the vertical concentration of henequen producers required 
increasing amounts of public money. However, the outcome of this new 
strategy, and the ejidatarios' responses to it are still to be discussed. 
Data available on ejidal production and Federal Government expenditure 
for henequen cultivation clearly show the existence and development of 
opposite trends (Figure 3). While increasing resources were invested and 
economic results in terms of credit advances recuperated, productivity levels 
were in decline. Figures show that credit advances by the Bank to ejidatarios 
had passed from 41 million pesos in 1955 to 136.1 million pesos in 1963. Cre-
dits had risen by as much as 331.9 percent. Yet the recuperation of credits was 
not as successful as their provision. While in 1955 only 28.4 percent (11.7 mill-
ion pesos) of the total credit advances had still to be recuperated, by 1963 a 
total of 311.2 million pesos representing 37.2 percent of the total credit 
advances lent to ejidatarios from 1955 through to 1963, was still to be paid 
back.18 
On the production side results were not encouraging either. Although out-
put rose very sharply in 1956 (66,533 tons) from the 1955 level (32,879 tons), 
increases from 1956 through 1963 were not very significant. As mentioned 
above, output actually decreased during 1955-1972 though during 1959-
1962 it reached its highest levels (Figure 3). The most significant indicator is 
that increasing Federal Government investment did not have a very high 
positive relationship with the enlargement of output. This is reflected in two 
facts. One is the decreasing yields measured in terms of kilos of raw-fibre 
obtained per harvested hectare. As can be observed in Figure 3, while in 
1956 755 kilos of fibre were obtained, only 539 kilos could be collected in 
1963. A real decrease of 4.7 percent in the average rate of growth had occur-
red. The second fact to be considered is the steady increase in the number of 
ejidatarios registered with the Bank to receive credit. As can also be 
observed in Figure 3 the number of credit receivers rose from 44,911 in 1955 
to 57,063 in 1963, an increase of 27 percent in the period considered. Not sur-
prisingly, in 1960 henequen ejidatarios represented 25.9 percent of Yucatan's 
economically active population (EAP), and 44.04 percent of the EAP was 
dedicated to agricultural activities.20 
In brief, from 1955 to 1963 as far as the henequen ejidal sector was con-
cerned, a slight decrease in output was strongly followed by decreasing 
yields, and an increasing number of producers in the activity. The combina-
tion of the two factors mentioned above meant that production costs rose. 
And since most of the henequen produced was to be exported, and export 
prices for raw fibre did not rise as production costs did, mounting losses for 
the Bank followed.21 
A general explanation of the situation facing Federal Government in this 
period of its involvement in the henequen industry is given by Brannon, as 
he argues that government policy-makers gave up using economic analysis in 
making decisions, and instead had recourse to political choices. Instead of 
scrapping marginally inefficient areas of henequen cultivation, and concen-
trating on more productive areas, improving agricultural techniques, and 
above all, letting ejidatarios face market conditions by themselves, a protec-
tive curtain of public investment was built up (the so-called market isolation 
mechanism), and henequen ejidatarios were allowed budgetary deficits. 
Although Brannon's argument has some explanatory power in accounting 
for government policies towards the henequen industry, it neverthless omits 
two important considerations. First, it does not take into account the 
analysis of the different approaches within the government agencies (i.e., 
the Bank) to handling the situation in the henequen industry. Thus, Brannon 
fails to consider the fact that although the Bank's policies, as stated, were 
mainly political, in 1962 the Federal Government set up a commission, led 
by two Yucatecan representatives to the Federal Congress, to study and con-
sult with the different institutions and organisations involved in the hene-
quen industry on how to modify the way the industry was run. The main argu-
ment put forward by the commission to government agencies (such as the 
Bank, the branch of the Ministry of Agriculture in Yucatan, Cordemex - at 
that time partially owned by the Federal Government - and the Liga de Com-
unidades Agrarias, the political organisation of peasants closely linked to the 
government) was the convenience of converting collective ejido lands into 
individual private estates. 
This proposal arose because parcelarios who were former hacienda work-
ers, and at the time owned small plots of land on a private basis, were shown 
to be performing better in economic terms than collective ejidos.22 The 
belief of the commission was that through imitating the parcelarios' pattern 
of organisation ouput would be enhanced and a more stable relationship be-
tween the government and producers would be established.23 
Figure 3 Yucatan's Henequen Zone: Land in Full Production, Yield of 
Fibre and Production: 1955-80. 
Source: Banrural (1981), Diagnostico Agropecuario del Estado de Yucatan 
It is also important to mention that all the agencies consulted, with the 
exception of the Liga de Comunidades Agrarias, agreed in principle with the 
proposal, though they considered it convenient for political reasons to carry 
it out by stages.24 This meant that the first lands to be privatised should be 
the non-cultivated ones, followed by the already cultivated ones. In this way 
the agencies consulted thought that political stability would not be dis-
rupted. 
Although the commission adopted these recommendations and passed 
them to the Federal Government (i.e., the President), no offical reaction 
concerning the commission's proposal's was received.25 However, in prac-
tice, ejidatarios and existing parcelarios who were willing and able were 
allowed, and encouraged by the government, to undertake private cultiva-
tion of non-cultivated ejido lands with henequen and other crops.26 
The importance of this process is that it is misleading to believe, as 
Brannon does, that no attempts were made by the government to modify its 
increasingly costly approach to the henequen industry. Even more impor-
tantly, Brannon does not consider that because the core of government 
economic policies was political, the economic effects among ejidatarios were 
also important. Even though it is difficult to believe that the policy of sub-
sidies by the government affected ejidatarios in the same way, it is clear that, 
for example, the take-over by a stratum of ejidatarios of their own collec-
tively owned lands, to be cultivated privately, was a consequence of govern-
ment policies.27 Although, as Brannon correctly points out, the Bank prog-
ressively eroded ejidatarios' entrepreneurship and their efforts to make their 
henequen fields economically productive and profitable, that did not pre-
vent these same ejidatarios from using government resources to start other 
activities (including henequen cultivation) over which they could have abso-
lute control.28 The security provided by the continuous flow of money 
resources from the Bank to ejidatarios (called 'credit' by the Bank, a 'weekly 
wage' by Brannon) constitutes, in my view, the backbone for the develop-
ment of the household economy in the henequen industry. 
The second, closely related point is that Brannon's view that ejidatarios 
became wage-labourers of the Bank (the Federal Government) emerges 
without an analysis of ejidatarios' responses to government policies, the class 
differentiation process created amongst ejido growers, and the actions taken 
by producers to secure their economic survival. His definition of ejidatarios 
as 'rural workers', an assertion for which evidence is not provided, is inflex-
ible and irrelevant. 
(b) 1964-72 
The second phase of the sub-period 1955-72 is characterised by a generalised 
deep crisis in the henequen industry, and the enforcement by the Federal 
Government all over Mexico of an economic policy which meant the develop-
ment of an industrial base financed by agriculture.29 This policy, called 
'desarrollo estabilizador9 (stabilised development) had its own effects upon 
the henequen industry. These were so damaging that more subsidies had to 
be given to ejidatarios, and more credits had to be written off by the Federal 
Government. This became an unavoidable necessity for the Federal Govern-
ment, not only to aid henequen growers in the agricultural side of the indus-
try, but in the industrial sphere as well. 
Another factor which deepened even further the economic crisis of the 
second half of the 1960s was the introduction by industrialised countries 
(hard-fibre consumers) of cheaper substitutes for natural hard-fibres such as 
henequen, sisal and abaca. Synthetic fibres made Yucatan's henequen 
exports continuously decrease, bringing about more economic difficulties. 
To counteract the economic effects that the introduction of synthetic fibres 
had on henequen exports, efforts to industrialise henequen fibre in Yucatan 
were re-initiated. 
The first attempt to develop a cordage industry in Yucatan goes back as far 
as the end of the 1870s. Among Yucatecan specialists and henequen produc-
ers, the case of La Industrial is very well known. It was the most serious 
attempt by pre-agrarian reform hacendados to develop this industrial value-
adding branch of the henequen industry. However, lack of unity among 
hacendados, US cordage companies (e.g. the International Harvester Co. 
and Peabody Co.), blockage of entry to the industry via market price dump-
ing against their Yucatecan competitors, etc., meant that these attempts 
failed.30 It was not, however, until the late 1930s that the infant Yucatecan 
cordage industry could slowly begin to take off. Under the favourable condi-
tions created by the Second World War, and the lack of tariff-barriers by the 
US government on these imports, Yucatecans began to develop their own 
cordage mills.31 Moreover, the financial aid provided to them by HedeYu -
subsidised raw fibre was sold to private cordage mills - strongly affected their 
development and consolidation. 
As in the case of the raw fibre export business, as far as the cordage indus-
try was concerned, wartime meant periods of economic bonanza, to be fol-
lowed by a post-war period characterised by low output prices, strong inter-
nal and external competition, stockpiling and mills going bust. The effects, 
however, of the post-war period were partially corrected by the Korean War 
(1951-53). However, this could not be more than a temporary respite. After 
this brief period of recovery, price-competition among mill-owners became 
so intense that the effects of their internecine economic activity even dam-
aged their raw fibre suppliers. Due to the fact that HedeYu sold raw fibre to 
mill-owners at subsidised rates while mill-owners were selling output at mar-
ket prices, it was not surprising that sometimes HedeYu's prices for raw fibre 
and those of mill-owners coincided, the latter sometimes being even lower 
than the former.32 To prevent more damage, in 1953 the Yucatecan govern-
ment promoted the organisation of Cordeleros de Mexico to try to work out 
common price policies among cordage industrialists.33 The economic envi-
ronment of constant decline in demand did not allow this to happen, and by 
1961 the industry was on the verge of collapse.34 The mill-owners tried to 
avoid bankruptcy by offering to sell the mills to the Federal Government. 
An offer to sell the factories for 250 million pesos was made to the Federal 
Government by the owners. It was, however, only at the end of 1961 that the 
government decided to come to the aid of the badly hit cordage industry.35 
The negotiations between the government and the mill-owners concluded 
with the former becoming shareholders of a new enterprise called Cordemex 
with 50 percent of shares and the option to buy the remaining half in a three 
year period. In return, private mill-owners received 125 million pesos to 
cover their debts and part of the value of the machinery. 
The inauguration of Cordemex as a partially state-owned enterprise 
brought about several important changes in the development of the cordage 
industry in Yucatan. First, the existence of only one enterprise eliminated 
fierce competition among individual proprietors, which in the past had 
proved to be very damaging. Second, Cordemex became the only firm 
authorised by law to industrialise the henequen fibre in Mexico.36 In fact, the 
foundation of Cordemex meant the take-over by the Federal Government of 
the whole henequen industry. The Bank 'controlled' the agricultural sector 
of henequen production and Cordemex controlled the industrial sector.37 
The complete control (vertical monopoly) of the cordage industry by the 
Federal Government did not take place until 1964. That year the Govern-
ment acquired the remaining 50 percent of Cordemex shares. A total of 189.5 
million pesos was paid to private owners for the remaining half of Cor-
demex's ownership (89.5 million pesos for fixed capital and 100 million pesos 
for outstanding debts).38 
Apart from the changes already mentioned, the creation of Cordemex 
also brought about several other changes. For example, the technological 
diversity of the 40 cordage mills inherited by Cordemex from former private 
ownership led the company to scrap the most inefficient ones, upgrade the 
equipment by acquiring new technology and machinery, and grade the qual-
ity of its products by international standards.39 Thus, by 1966, Cordemex had 
closed six of the old mills, in 1967 only 11 out of 40 were working, and in 1979 
only six very modern mills were still functioning.40 
Another important change was that state-ownership of Cordemex also 
meant the possibility of undertaking research projects to find new industrial 
uses for henequen fibre and other henequen by-products, as well as internal 
and external promotion of its products. Public money was made available for 
all these projects.41 One of the most important changes, however, from the 
1961 Cordemex era to that of 1964, was the new role assigned to the enter-
prise. Whereas before nationalisation was complete Cordemex continued 
operating as a profit-maximising firm, after 1964 its main purpose - at least 
in theory - was to pursue the raising of income and improvement in the stan-
dard of living of henequen growers and Cordemex workers. Cordemex was 
thus incorporated, as the Bank had been long before, into the policy which 
allowed the Federal Government to be a negotiator between henequen 
growers and the market, particularly the international market, a policy 
which proved disastrous for Cordemex and for the dynamics assumed by the 
household economy during 1964-72.42 
As mentioned above, the newly state-owned Cordemex was granted 
monopsony status by the law, and possessed generous budgets backed up by 
the government to achieve two goals: a) to obtain profit making prices for 
henequen manufactured goods, and b) as a consequence of the former, to 
pay better prices for henequen growers' raw fibre. 
In any account of the economic history of the cordage industry in Yucatan, 
the link between Cordemex, a state monopoly after 1964, and what hap-
pened in the agricultural sector of the henequen industry is very important. 
It has already been stated that during the 1960s the predominant policy of 
the Mexican government for the economy as a whole came to be known as 
'desarrollo estabilizador'. This policy, which was particularly emphasised 
during the period 1965-70, meant three basic things: 
a) The pursuit of economic growth based on the strengthening and 
development of industry via indigenous and multinational investments in 
what were called 'new and necessary' investments. The role of the govern-
ment was to support and encourage new investment as much as possible, 
while not having owner-responsibility in those industries. 
b) The application of discriminatory price policies towards agricultural 
output as a way of ensuring that industries' price-wages rose slowly or, if 
possible, not at all. 
c) As a direct result of the second goal of the policy, to have low levels of 
inflation. 
d) Restraint on public investment as much as possible. 
In the henequen industry in the period 1965 through 1970, the desarrollo 
estabilizador policy meant the freezing of raw fibre prices in favour of Cor-
demex. Although the Bank was the entity in charge of setting prices for raw-
fibre, and Cordemex for industrial output, the latter was able to impose its 
policy upon the Bank's.43 Thus, for six years (1965-70) while average raw 
fibre prices were kept at 1.06 pesos per kilo, average costs were running well 
above that figure (Banrural, 1981). 
The effects of this price policy were clear-cut. On the one hand, Cordemex 
was able to make some profits, while on the other hand, the Bank sustained 
huge losses. However, it would be misleading to state the argument in this 
way without indicating the presence of other factors which affected the 
development of the industry. 
Between 1955 and 1963 the agricultural sector of the henequen industry 
did show an improvement relative to the first half of the 1950s. I have also 
pointed out that recovery was more noticeable in the case of private produc-
ers than in that of ejidatarios.44 Throughout the second half of the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 1970s, however, the situation, far from improving, got 
worse. According to data for all henequen growers, from 1964 to 1972 output 
decreased by an average rate of 1.7 percent per annum. Productivity also 
went down by 0.6 percent per annum.45 As for the ejidal side, the picture was 
not very much different. Although output rose by an average rate of growth 
of 1.2 percent over the period 1964-72, it was 6.9 percent lower relative to 
the period of 1955-64 (Figure 3). Productivity also decreased by as much as 
2.0 percent, probably as a direct result of the increasing number of 
ejidatarios under the Bank's credit coverage. While in 1964 there were 
57,038, in 1972, 66,661 ejidatarios had been accepted as eligible for credit 
provision. This increase represented an average rate of 2.4 percent per 
annum (Figure 3). 
The effects of these facts on the Bank's financial position were not surpris-
ing. Non-recuperated credits escalated to 779.7 million pesos over the same 
period. These losses, however, were compensated by the fact that the level 
of investment by the Bank actually went down from 1964 through 1970 by 
17.4 percent relative to the level it had been in 1964, and did not pick up 
again until 1971.46 Desarrollo estabilizador for the agricultural sector of the 
henequen industry thus meant less public funding and deliberately fixed 
lower prices for henequen growers' output.47 The fact that the Federal Gov-
ernment had control of every sector of the industry (i.e., money supply for 
investment, supply and demand of raw fibre) meant that the enforcement of 
the economic deflationary policy for agriculture could be carried out. 
As the economic performance of the henequen industry deteriorated so 
did political stability. In 1966 and 1969, ejidatario henequen-growers strongly 
mobilised themselves against the effects of the desarrollo estabilizador pol-
icy. On two occasions in these years peasants occupied Merida, Yucatan's 
capital state. New concessions had to be granted to partially alleviate the 
progressive deterioration of their standard of living. In 1966,7 million pesos 
were distributed among peasants as supposed 1965 harvest-season profits; 
and in 1969, a bonus to be paid every December was also agreed.48 
Prior to the 1969 movement, the Bank had already tried, as before, to 
counteract the effects of the crisis affecting not only the producers, but also 
its own finances. In December 1966, the Chairman of the Bank put forward 
the proposal to invest 27 million pesos for ejidatarios to raise cattle. Credits 
given to ejidatarios to perform unnecessary premature weedings and other 
non-productive activities in the henequen fields, as a way of countering 
recurring unemployment and increasing lack of growers' interest in their 
activities, were to be productively used in this new diversification prog-
ramme.49 The opportunity to enlarge the 150,000 livestock already under 
private control by ejidatarios would, according to the chairman, not only 
benefit ejidatarios and the Bank alike, but also Yucatan's economy as a 
whole.50 Another programme to cultivate non-henequen crops outside the 
henequen zone was also initiated. Moreover, as a result of the economic 
crisis, according to a report published by the Agraria henequenera (Hene-
quen Agrarian Reform Commission), during the period 1962-68, tax holi-
days (i.e., subsidies) of 51.3 million pesos were granted to ejidatarios and 
18.5 million pesos to pequenos propietarios (former hacendados).51 In brief, 
despite the fact that the desarrollo estabilizador strategy was successfully 
enforced in the agricultural sector of the henequen industry, by the end of 
the sixties it had to be abandoned and substituted by both increasing non-
recuperated credits (already swollen) and extra-subsidies.52 
As for the industrial sector of the henequen industry, results were not as 
bad as in the agricultural sphere. As mentioned above, with the foundation 
of Cordemex under government ownership, internal market production, 
technical modernisation, expansion of production capacity, and a subsidised 
price-policy for inputs, profits were expected to be generated.53 Although 
during the second half of the sixties Cordemex managed to make profits of 
as much as 11 million pesos these were initially very modest.54 There were 
several reasons for this unsatisfactory performance. Cordemex's own 
relationship with the hard-fibres international market reveals strong compet-
ition developed from two sides. First, from the second half of the sixties 
onwards, it was clear that the cordage industry in developed countries had 
found a way of competing with their henequen and sisal counterparts by 
manufacturing the same products using synthetic fibres.55 
The reason for the development of this new industry on the demand side 
of the hard-fibres international market (i.e., industrialised countries, and 
mainly the United States in the case of henequen) was due, as in the past, to 
the search for substitutes for henequen, and, more importantly, to increases 
in prices which buyers could not control. In spite of the fact that buyers had 
actual monopoly control of the market, this has never prevented sudden 
upward trends in prices either for raw fibre or manufactured goods made 
from it.56 Although synthetics did not completely displace natural hard-fibre 
manufactures from the market, they certainly took over some sections of it, 
such as the rope and cable markets, and to a lesser extent the markets for 
packing and industrial twines.57 According to Brannon, the synthetics' share 
of the markets in developed countries rose from 2 to 7 percent from 1966 to 
1970.58 
The effects of the synthetics industry development on Cordemex were vis-
ible. Cordemex's exports to the international market fell from 70,500 metric 
tons in 1964 to 45,900 metric tons in 1970, and from 67,500 metric tons to 
41,000 metric tons to Cordemex's main buyers (i.e., US buyers) during the 
same period.59 
The second source of competition for Cordemex came from other hard-
fibre manufacturers. As a result of falling demand and prices for raw fibre, 
and the synthetics industry's development, sisal raw fibre producers, such as 
Brazil and Tanzania, which had remained only as raw fibre suppliers, were 
following a two-fold strategy by the end of the 1960s. First, the world's 
natural hard-fibre production declined as a response to the fall in demand 
and the subsequent drop in prices. Second, sisal producers started proces-
sing raw fibre.60 As a result of this development inside sisal producer-coun-
tries, Cordemex's control of the United States' market for its different pro-
ducts receded in favour particularly of Brazil and Tanzania. Thus, for exam-
ple, one of Cordemex's best product-sellers in the North American market 
(harvest twine) dipped in sales by as much as 18 percent compared with pre-
vious levels between 1964 and 1970.61 This trend, as we shall see later, 
developed over a length of time. 
In these conditions (i.e., increasing competition from substitutes, over-
seas sisal manufacturers, and falling price trends) Cordemex was able to 
obtain some profits during 1964-70 only because its control over the growing 
domestic market enabled it to apply a discriminatory price policy. If profits 
could not be made in international markets because of the factors mentioned 
above, the internal market monopoly lawfully granted to Cordemex in 1962 
could provide them.62 Revenues were thus obtained by billing internal 
buyers with higher prices than those for overseas consumers.63 Yet this inter-
nal price advantage protected by the law could not last for long. Both private 
cordage henequen mills (called cordelerias piratas), and the development of 
cordage mills within Mexico, would eventually erode Cordemex's monopoly 
control over Mexico's domestic market, and contribute further to its deepen-
ing economic crisis. 
Lack of coordination between Cordemex's needs and those of the Bank 
and the henequen growers had also to be considered to understand govern-
ment policies in the henequen industry. In my view, despite the fact that the 
Bank and Cordemex were both Federal Government agencies, their deci-
sions, programmes, etc., had little to do with each other's needs. The paths 
of their development contemplated as little collaboration and coordination 
between them as possible. For example, in the case of Cordemex an output 
capacity expansion investment programme carried out during the second 
half of the 1960s did not consider at all the possibility of investing large sums 
in the availability of idle output capacity.64 As the ejidos' production 
declined, instead of coming to agreements with the Bank to take some action 
on this issue, in 1967 Cordemex started an investment programme to set up 
its own defibrating mills in the henequen zone. The aim of this project was 
to control as closely as possible the leaf rasping process in order to produce 
the best possible fibre-quality, and buy leaves from any henequen grower 
(either ejidal or private) willing to sell them.65 Due to the fact that almost all 
ejidos' leaves were defibrated at the Bank's own facilities, and former hacen-
dados were still using their own to rasp their output, it was thought that par-
celarios' leaves could be processed at Cordemex's plants.66 
Prior to Cordemex establishing its own defibrating plants, parcelarios 
used to take their leaves to pequenos propietarios' facilities. However, a 
price policy by Cordemex encompassing a more flexible system for pricing 
leaves was established. This meant paying according to leaf size rather than 
by raw-fibre kilos obtained for each thousand leaves defibrated (as the Bank 
and pequenos propietarios did).Moreover, immediate payment in cash as 
deliveries arrived at the plants, and political cooperation from parcelarios' 
organisations, properly encouraged by the promise of subsidies, enabled 
Cordemex to capture parcelarios' output.67 These incentive arrangements, 
however, did not solve Cordemex's increasing needs for raw fibre, mainly 
because parcelarios' output represented a small proportion of the total raw 
fibre produced in the henequen zone.68 
If the Bank had largely lost control over ejidatarios' economic functioning, 
Cordemex's lack of coordination and collaboration with it could not impede 
the ejidatarios. Indeed they became the main constraint on its development, 
and the accelerator in its economic decline. 
II. 1973-1976 
The political crisis of 1968 brought about in Mexico a change in the role of 
the Federal Government in the economy.69 The supportive role adopted by 
the State throughout the sixties was transformed (particularly from 1973 
through 1976) into a more involved role in the running of the economy. 
Increased public expenditure in agriculture and industry, the foundation of 
new state agencies to provide services, technical assistance, etc., and the 
inauguration of a political process called 'apertura democratica' which 
encouraged political expression and participation were very much on the 
agenda of the new Echeverria administration (1970-76). 
In Yucatan and the henequen industry in particular, these new policies 
were put into practice with more emphasis on certain issues than on others. 
Undoubtedly, the most notorious of all was the attempt to convert collective 
henequen ejidos into highly capitalised agro-industrial units of production. 
To achieve this, ownership of Cordemex's decorticating mills would be trans-
ferred to ejidatarios and new ejido-ruled enterprises would also be founded 
to industrialise henequen by-products such as steroids, cellulose, animal 
foodstuffs etc. 
During a troublesome visit to Yucatan in 1972, to inaugurate the incorpora-
tion of henequen peasants within the state-controlled social security system, 
President Echeverria encountered political discontent from ejidatarios. 
They asked for social and economic reforms to ease their already deteriorat-
ing economic situation. As a result of this political mobilisation by peasants, 
and studies carried out by different government agencies, Echeverria prop-
osed a plan of action by the Federal Government in the henequen industry. 
The government plan included the implementation of three major program-
mes: 
a) The development of a diversification programme in those areas of the 
henequen zone where yields were very low. These areas would be used to 
establish cattle raising and citrus cultivation projects. The objective was 
that 50,000 henequen growers, out of the total of 80,000 expected to be 
registered with the Bank, would have a job in these new developments. 
The remaining 30,000 would remain as henequen growers. 
b) Twenty new decorticating mills would be built by Cordemex in the 
henequen zone technically able to process henequen by-products, such as 
juices, bagasse, and short fibre to produce a variety of products using 
these as inputs. The ownership of these defibrating mills, using official 
credits made available to ejidatarios by the Bank, would eventually be 
sold to the former by Cordemex. And new projected ejido enterprises, 
such as Productos de Henequen Sociedad Ejidal (PROHESE), Industrias 
Quimicas Ejidales (IQUIESE), Sociedad Ejidal Desfibradora Carrillo 
Puerto, and others would also be created and owned by ejidatarios.70 
c) An ambitious programme of land clearing (desmontes) would also be 
carried out in the South of Yucatan to incorporate fertile lands suitable for 
the cultivation of both food and cash crops for internal and external con-
sumption. 
The first two programmes are of major importance in the analysis since 
they represented the cornerstone of the new government strategy. To rein-
force political control of the peasantry through their government-linked 
organisation (Liga de Comunidades Agrarias or CNC's71 branch in Yucatan) 
the aim was to give ejidatarios economic decision-making power never offi-
cially granted them before. As Menendez (1981) argues, the government 
wanted to promote the capitalisation of the ejido and through it the re-intro-
duction of campesino production. 
As for the first programme, a study carried out by the Ministry of Water 
Resources provided the guidelines to be followed. The study considered that 
in certain areas of the henequen zone (e.g., Maxcanu, Acanceh, and Dzid-
zantun) to continue growing henequen was irrational in economic terms. 
Since these areas had been incorporated in the production of henequen 
when peaks in demand had required it, the current decline did not justify 
keeping them. Poor yields and high production costs required the search for 
alternative agricultural activities to be developed in those areas. The study 
also adds that to have maintained credits flowing towards these areas for the 
cultivation of henequen would have encouraged the idea of credit promoting 
consumption rather than production. The Bank's budget for these areas had 
thus become dependent not on the requirements of the production process, 
but rather on the needs of the number of ejidatarios registered with the Bank 
eligible to receive credits which would enable them to meet their basic 
needs. 
The persistence of a monocrop cultivation path of development in those 
areas where profits could not be made had, according to the study, also 
brought about the abandonment of other crops more suitable for these 
areas, such as maize, beans, fruit, etc. One important consequence of this 
had been the need to import increasing amounts of food and other com-
modities to satisfy local needs.72 
As a solution to the situation mentioned above, the study proposed to 
scrap those inefficient and uneconomic henequen areas, and to initiate other 
activities there. Based on their own findings, the study's authors recom-
mended that non-henequen activities such as cattle raising and fruit cultiva-
tion should replace henequen.73 Over a period in which projects would 
develop, 30,000 unproductive henequen growers would find a job in these 
activities leaving only 40,000 cultivating henequen.74 These projects were 
implemented and are still in existence in the areas mentioned. The results, 
however, have been mixed. Even though henequen cultivation has been 
strongly discouraged and replaced by cattle raising and fruit cultivation, 
henequen is still a better income-generating activity than those alternatives. 
Furthermore, it is common to find ejidatarios incorporated in the non-hene-
quen projects while remaining registered (at least as far as credit provision 
is concerned) as henequen growers. Hence, the objective of displacing the 
labour force from henequen to other activities has failed, without producing 
enhanced productivity or competitiveness. It is a widespread view among 
Bank officials that the diversification programmes are a financial failure. 
The second programme, to give ejidatarios control over Cordemex's decor-
ticating plants, was undoubtedly of major importance. As it was posed, the 
programme is intended to meet a longstanding economic claim by the peas-
ants. To own the defibrating plants would give ejidatarios access to this inter-
mediate value-adding agro-industrial phase in the manufacture of hene-
quen. In addition, henequen sub-products could also be industrialised by 
firms under ejidatarios' ownership.75 This, in fact, would represent another 
source of income apart from the traditional one obtained only by selling raw 
fibre.76 
The theory behind the programme was that if henequen growers were the 
producers of the leaves (i.e., raw fibre and sub-products), and their cultiva-
tion made sense in economic terms only because of their industrialisation, 
they (the ejidatarios) should be entitled to benefit from it. Moreover, it was 
believed that only through this transference of ownership could the ejido 
become capitalised and self-sufficent. Although in 1974 one of Cordemex's 
defibrating mills was formally given by the President himself to ejidatarios, 
the programme did not progress any further and when Echeverria relin-
quished power in 1976 it was actually abandoned. 
Political opposition from different Federal Government agencies in Yuca-
tan, the local Government, former hacendados and even the Cordemex 
worker's union, brought the programme to a standstill. The local govern-
ment, the Bank, and former hacendados, for example, all opposed the prog-
ramme since it might might affect them severely. As for the former hacen-
dados who had the political support of the local government, the programme 
would have meant speeding up the dismantling of their 160 defibrating 
plants still in existence.77 Due to the fact that Cordemex's plants had enough 
capacity to defibrate all leaves produced in the henequen zone, and were 
much more efficient than the former hacendados', their take-over by 
ejidatarios would have meant that the former hacendados' rasping mills, 
decorticating ejidatarios' leaves, would have had to close.78 
The Bank agreed with the local government and former hacendados since 
the programme posed a direct threat to the control it had over the commer-
cialisation of raw fibre. As mentioned, the Bank is actually the middleman 
between ejidatarios and Cordemex. Furthermore its forty defibrating plants 
used by ejidatarios would also be under threat since Cordemex's plants 
would now process all output. 
Even though Cordemex officials publicly supported the programme, they 
did very little to implement it. Not without reason, Cordemex officials saw 
ejidatarios' control of its plants as a serious impediment to the firm's 
economic future. Security and the maintenance of increasingly scarce raw 
fibre coming into those Cordemex industrial plants with ejidatarios in charge 
of the decorticating process was very much in doubt. Lack of expertise on the 
side of the ejidatarios was also claimed by Cordemex's top bureaucrats as an 
argument against the project.79 
Menendez (1981) also argues that another source of opposition to the pro-
ject within Cordemex was that the firm had already signed an agreement 
with a multinational company to use henequen juices to produce chemical 
products. Ejidatarios' ownership of the defibrating plants would have upset 
the agreement and flow of badly needed cash for Cordemex. 
Finally, the Cordemex defibrating mill workers' union also opposed 
ejidatarios becoming their employers. As a left-wing organisation, it saw this 
move by the Federal Government as a way of confronting peasants with 
workers-peasants. The possibility of the latter taking industrial action to 
improve their working conditions would thus be avoided.80 
The political forces opposing the programme succeeded. Cordemex's 
plants were kept under the firm's ownership and control. However, the 
Bank's forty defibrating plants were transferred to ejidatarios, though the 
Bank remained very much in control of them. The technical capabilities and 
productivity levels of the Bank's plant could not, however, be compared with 
the Cordemex facilities which ejidatarios were fighting for in the first 
instance.81 The third programme, to open new cultivating areas in the south 
of the state, was conceived as a medium-term project which progressed over 
the second half of the seventies. 
The renewed attempt by the Federal Government to find a solution to the 
henequen industry and its involvement in trying to re-capitalise ejidos not 
only failed, it proved incapable of preventing the crisis in the henequen 
industry deepening. With the exception of 1973 and 1974, when the world oil 
crisis brought about extraordinary, and temporary increases of prices, the 
period 1973-76 was very much one of economic decline. As Figures 2 and 3 
demonstrate, output by both private producers and ejidatarios sharply 
declined. Although yields did not decrease sharply among private produc-
ers, in the ejido sector they did go down by an average rate of 43.3 percent 
(1973-76). The number of ejidatarios also continued rising: from almost 
70,000 registered with the Bank in 1973, to 80,100 ejidatarios in 1976. Since 
public investment continued to be very much concentrated on the cultiva-
tion of henequen, and this was the main activity in Yucatan, ejidatarios 
tended to group themselves in the industry. To be a client of the Bank meant 
a secure source of income. It enabled them either to devote themselves to 
cultivating their private plots of land or to engage themselves as wage work-
ers in urban and/or rural activities. As argued above, public expenditure for 
henequen ejidatarios not only became a means of survival, but also for some 
a way of reproducing themselves as peasants. 
On the industrial side of the henequen industry, the abandoning by the 
State of the desarrollo estabilizador economic policy during the 1970s 
brought, in the case of Cordemex, new problems. The disadvantageous con-
ditions of the international market (i.e., falling demand, stronger competi-
tion, lower prices), and competing political factions within the Federal Gov-
ernment to control the firm, increased pressure on the already shaky 
economic situation of Cordemex. Power over Cordemex's destiny was 
increasingly exercised by the President himself. Despite the financial dif-
ficulties Cordemex was going through, President Echeverria agreed to raise 
the price of grade A fibre from 1.55 pesos per kilo to 7 pesos per kilo.82 Simi-
lar action was repeated in 1975, when a generous agreement was signed with 
the defibrating mill-workers' union.83 
The oil embargo in 1973-74 introduced by OPEC countries to indus-
trialised oil buyers, brought unexpected relief to Cordemex's finances. Short-
ages of petrochemical sub-products increased costs for synthetic fibre pro-
ducers, making the market turn in favour of henequen and sisal manufactur-
ers. To Cordemex this expected boost in international purchases of manufac-
tured natural hard-fibre goods during 1973 and 1974 allowed it to generate 
profits for the first time since 1967. In 1973, profits of 131.8 million pesos 
were made, and the figure for 1974 was 118.0 million pesos.84 
Although periods of extraordinary increases in profit-making had been 
followed by depression (i.e., wartimes vis-a-vis post-war periods) extremely 
damaging to the henequen industry, these lessons were not learnt or else 
were purposely forgotten by Cordemex officials. In 1973 a programme to 
build twenty new defibrating mills was undertaken, the labour force and the 
fringe benefits for them were enlarged, and a joint investment venture to 
establish a Cordemex branch in Tanzania was agreed. Moreover, a 
generalised expansion of Cordemex's activities was the sort of action taken 
in the certainty that permanent recovery had come. 
The results could not have been more disastrous. In 1975, when the oil 
embargo had finished, Cordemex's exports had declined from 82,500 tons 
(1975) and 63,500 tons (1974) to only 40,800 tons (1975). Although some 
recovery came about in 1976 (73,600 tons were sold), sales were still below 
their 1973 value. 
The most damaging effect was, on the other hand, registered in the value 
of exports. While the value in 1973 was 634.8 million pesos, and 995 million 
pesos in 1974, it was only 359.5 million pesos in 1975.85 For Cordemex, the 
outcome of the 1975-76 period was the accumulation of losses totalling 
1,052.5 million pesos. And the accumulated debt since Cordemex had been 
founded as a state-owned enterprise, i.e. from 1964 up to 1976, had mounted 
to 1,226.1 million pesos. This represented almost half of the Bank's accumu-
lated losses during the same period. 
III. 1977-1980 
A study carried out by Banrural in 1977 forecast that according to the upward 
trend of non-recuperated credits in previous years, the Bank's losses from 
1976 to 1986 would go up as much as 8,876.9 million pesos.86 The same year 
(1977), as a result of Mexico's financial crisis, the Federal Government had 
signed a three year financial assistance accord with the International Monet-
ary Fund (IMF). The conditions governing the agreement were clear cut. 
The Mexican Government would obtain a loan to cover its debts with inter-
national creditors, in exchange for a well-designed IMF package of 
economic measures for economies facing balance of payments constraints. 
Public expenditure would be reduced, wage increases lowered below the rate 
of inflation or frozen if possible, prices would be allowed to behave accord-
ing to market conditions, and subsidies to production and/or consumption 
were to be stopped. Loss-making institutions like the Bank and Cordemex 
fit very well into the IMF's policies, and although expenditure cuts were 
made in both institutions, the Bank (in effect the ejidatarios) was to take the 
heavier burden. 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, it was repeatedly mentioned among 
Bank officials that the number of ejidatarios receiving credit from the Bank 
did not correspond to the actual number working in the henequen fields. 
Bank bureaucrats, ejidatarios and ejidatarios' representatives were fre-
quently named as the beneficiaries of money delivered to either non-existent 
or already dead ejidatarios. Yet, it was not until the 1977 financial crisis that 
action was taken on the issue. Fresh studies of the henequen industry by gov-
ernment officials recommended important changes. In November 1977, the 
recently inaugurated President Lopez Portillo (1976-82) announced reforms 
to be introduced in January 1978. The most important were the following: 
1. A new institution from 1978 called Fideicomiso Henequenero would 
take-over Banrural's financial dealings with ejidatarios. 
2. Thirty thousand ejidatarios registered with the Bank as credit receivers 
would be deleted since they were considered to be either non-existent or 
non-ejidatarios. 
3. New arrangements for the provision of credits would be established. 
First, credit and subsidy would be clearly differentiated. In the case of 
short term loans, 70 percent of them would be credit and 30 percent sub-
sidy, and the other way round in the case of long term loans. Second, cre-
dit would be delivered in strict accordance with the accomplishment of 
tasks arranged on a weekly basis between ejidatarios and Fideicomiso per-
sonnel. 
4. A programme of new henequen sowings would also be initiated.87 
5. The diversification programme initiated in 1973 would be expanded 
and re-orientated to promote the cultivation of suitable non-henequen 
crops. For this purpose, a land clearing programme within the henequen 
zone would be developed.88 
The core of the new programme (very much in line with IMF guidelines) 
was to eliminate those producers who could survive only because of govern-
ment subsidies, but at the same time support the ablest ones. As we shall see 
below, this was the criterion used by Fideicomiso and Banrural personnel to 
work out expenditure plans for henequen. 
The reasoning used by the government was that if the producers' economic 
situation could be financially improved, they would look after their plots 
carefully, productivity would rise, production costs would be lowered, and 
competitiveness would grow. As the government had expected, the elimina-
tion of a large number of ejidatarios from credit provision was the most dif-
ficult item in the programme of reforms. Although it would be misleading to 
argue that political unrest by ejidatarios reached uncontrollable proportions 
as a result of putting it into practice, angry demonstrations against the Bank 
and the government did take place, in areas such as Motul, Maxanu and 
Seye. 
In January 1978, after several weeks of increasingly tense confrontations 
between ejidatarios and the government, a settlement was reached. The gov-
ernment would set up a commission to review the cases of those ejidatarios 
claiming to have agrarian rights to remain as the Bank's clients.89 Second, it 
was agreed that a productivity bonus called 'Sobrecredito' would not be 
eliminated as planned in the credit quota for weedings (chapeos). 
An unexpected outcome of the process was the voluntary separation from 
the Bank (mainly in the area of Motul) of about two thousand ejidatarios cal-
ling themselves Autonomos (Autonomous). These ejidatarios became inde-
pendent henequen growers. It is worth mentioning that Autonomos repre-
sent the Federal Government's most radical expression of the promotion of 
householders to the category of independent growers. According to findings 
during fieldwork in Muxupip, those ejidatarios who received more credit 
during their dealings with the Bank before the rationalisation process (de-
puracion) took place, declared themselves autonomous from the Bank. 
In the context of the economic crisis in which the filtering process was car-
ried out, the whole idea of the process was not only to reduce public expen-
diture, but also to make resources available to the least possible number of 
ejidatarios. The lower the number of clients, the larger the amount of credit 
to be received by each one of them. As a matter of fact, the ejidatarios who 
survived the rationalisation process improved their income levels in real 
terms, though working hours were now longer since fewer growers were in 
the fields. The depuracion was also used to encourage entrepreneurship, and 
eliminate underemployment. In 1980, these two aims were strengthened 
with further credit increases.90 
The long term effects of the reform programme initiated in 1978, in both 
the agricultural and industrial sectors of the henequen industry, are still to be 
assessed. However, some of them are already apparent. Public expenditure 
in henequen activities has progressively declined while in other activities it 
has been increased. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in Figure 2 in 
which the Federal Government's expenditure in henequen is measured as a 
percentage of Yucatan's GDP. 91 The reason for this change, as already men-
tioned, is that the Federal Government intends to improve production and 
productivity in the henequen industry, but at the same time is trying to drive 
Yucatan's economy away from monocrop cultivation. 
On the agricultural side of Yucatan's economy this move has been acknow-
ledged by increasing expenditure in cattle raising and citrus fruit cultivation 
within and outside the henequen zone (Figure 2).92 And as for henequen, 
improvements did occur (in the ejido sector) as a result of the 1978 reforms. 
Yields (i.e. kilos of raw fibre per hectare) rose by an average rate of 4.8 per-
cent (Figure 4). Output and land in full production, however, decreased by 
an average of 9.6 per cent and 6.3 percent respectively. These two indicators 
were expected to decrease since new 1979 sowings could not start producing 
until at least 1984. In the henequen zone as a whole (including private and 
ejido production) yields showed a slight improvement (average rate of 0.2 
percent), but output decreased by 5.0 percent. 
The most difficult side of the activity continued to be the financial one. 
Despite the fact that in December 1978 Lopez Portillo condoned the 
ejidatarios' accumulated debts (1955-77) of 2,844.3 million pesos, from 1978 
to 1980 alone losses had reached 2290.7 million pesos (Figure 5). Even 
higher losses were partially offset by improvements which occurred in the 
relationship between average cost vis-a-vis average price. Subsidy payments 
have continuously declined from 1978 onwards. 
The 1978 programme gave particular emphasis to the further improve-
ment of diversification activities in the henequen zone. Although it may be 
too early to produce a definite assessment of these non-henequen projects, 
data available indicate that initial results are very poor indeed. Unfortu-
nately, disaggregated data by years for henequen and non-henequen 
activities between 1978 and 1980 are not available. 
On the industrial side of the industry, Cordemex's production and finan-
cial situation did not improve during the period of analysis. On the contrary, 
Cordemex's volume of sales decreased from 1977 to 1981, and its accumu-
lated debt from 1976 to 1979 reached 2652 million pesos. Although the value 
of its sales increased from 1977 to 1979 this was not enough to counterba-
lance the firm's rising operational costs.93 In spite of the fact that output 
prices continued rising during the second half of the 1970s, as industrialised 
economies expanded, cordage producers using synthetics managed to main-
tain competitiveness with natural hard-fibre manufacturers or even, in some 
products (e.g., harvest twine), to produce them more cheaply.94 
Beyond Cordemex's chronic difficulties in its relationships with overseas 
buyers and competitors, two new factors within Mexico started exerting 
fresh economic pressure. First, as Mexico's agricultural sector grew, so did its 
need for henequen manufactured products. As already mentioned, Mexico's 
domestic market for these products and Cordemex's monopoly control of it, 
had enabled the firm to charge higher prices to domestic buyers. This price 
discriminatory policy had avoided exacerbating Cordemex's financial con-
tracts. Yet private cordage mills have recently entered the industry. 
Although according to the 1952 Ley de Saturation de las Fibras Duras they 
are supposed to be illegal, nobody apart from Cordemex bureaucrats has 
tried to stop their development within and outside Yucatan.95 Their number 
is not certain, but Vera (1981) estimated that in 1981 twenty-nine private 
mills were in operation in Yucatan, fourteen in the neighbouring State of 
Campeche, ten in Mexico city, four in the State of San Luis Potosi, and four 
in Tamaulipas.96 Their technological and production capacities vary greatly 
from one factory to another, but what is certain is that their operational costs 
are much lower than Cordemex's. The hiring of a labour force on a non-per-
manent basis enables them to adapt themselves as the market contracts or 
expands, and thereby to compete efficiently with Cordemex. The effects on 
Cordemex of their entry into the cordage industry have been devastating. 
Cordemex's share of the domestic market has been reduced, and closures of 
factories and, consequently, worker redundancies, have followed.97 
The second constraining factor on Cordemex's well-being has been the 
acute shortage of its raw fibre supplies. Despite Cordemex's efforts to exert 
more control over the agricultural sector of the industry, it has not been able 
to satisfy its own needs. The best indicator of this raw fibre shortage is the ris-
ing idle capacity in Cordemex's mills. In 1979 this was estimated to be 35 per-
cent, and almost 50 percent in 1980.98 Idle capacity had existed in Cor-
demex's decorticating mills ever since investments aimed at expanding pro-
duction capacity had failed. It was not until 1981 that an agreement was 
reached with the Fideicomiso to start defibrating ejido leaves at Cordemex's 
facilities in certain areas of the henequen zone (mainly Motul). This accord 
has eased somewhat Cordemex's urgent need for input.99 
Figure 4 Yucatan's Henequen Zone: Mature Land Area in Full Production 
and Yields: 1955-80. 
Kilos per hectare 
Sources: Secretaria de Agricultura de Recursos Hidraulicos (1979); 
Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto (1982); Banrural (1981), 
Estadisticas de Henequen. 
Figure 5 Banrural's accumulated non-recuperated credits, credit advances, 
and advances recuperated, 1955-80. 
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Source: Banrural (1981), Estadisticas de Henequen. 
Finally, as a long term solution to the declining nature of the cordage 
industry, Cordemex technically equipped five of its sixteen defibrating 
plants to produce henequen by-products, as inputs for the chemical and 
paper industries. Joint research projects with local universities and govern-
ment scientific centres were undertaken to develop the appropriate technol-
ogy for the commercial use of these by-products. This development, and 
most importantly, the availability of resources to finance it, seem to suggest 
that such new commercial uses will not introduce significant changes in the 
industry's progress in the near future. 
Conclusion 
The abandoning of direct state control and ownership of the henequen indus-
try in 1955, and its replacement by indirect control (vertical control of pro-
ducers) did not bring about what was intended. As I have demonstrated, 
Federal Government financial aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s has 
increased its losses in the industry. Despite heavy investments and subsidies, 
steady decline in output and productivity have been only sporadically offset 
by brief periods of expansion, induced by international market forces and 
government changes in the provision of credit to henequen ejidatarios. 
Growing numbers of ejidatarios as credit receivers have also contributed 
to the Federal Government's very costly involvement in the activity, since the 
Bank usually adapted its own credit strategy (except from 1970 onwards) to 
ejidatarios' needs rather than to needs dictated by the relationship between 
market conditions and the industry. Ejidatarios' isolation from market condi-
tions by the Bank, through unproductive investments and increasing sub-
sidies, was chosen as the policy to be applied. 
The recurring explanation offered for this by specialists on the henequen 
industry has usually been the need to maintain political stability and control 
of the peasantry. Political control thus became more important than 
economic growth. According to Brannon (1980) and Menendez (1981) since 
Yucatan's economy is, and has been, heavily dependent on the henequen 
industry, and ejidatarios have been the majority of agricultural producers in 
the State, their potential threat to the political system was to be bought off 
with public money. Henequen ejidatarios' dependence on government credit 
provision enabled them to be controlled politically. With the exception of 
occasional outbreaks, the political peace has in general been maintained. 
As also mentioned, another popular view among these writers (Brannon, 
1980, Menendez, 1981) is that the Federal Government's involvement in the 
henequen industry has brought about the proletarianisation of peasants. 
Some authors (e.g., Menendez, 1981) have qualified their views relating the 
character of peasant politics to governmental expenditure and periods of 
expansion or contraction. According to this revised view, in periods of 
economic recession, when government expenditure has been reduced, hene-
quen peasants have adopted proletarian political postures. When govern-
ment expenditure has expanded peasants have fought for the reconstitution 
of the peasant economy. 
In my view, neither of these approaches is correct. Soon after reprivatisa-
tion in 1955 the Federal Government had lost control of the ejidos. The use 
of the Bank's resources at the ejido level became an investment/consumption 
inflow to the peasants rather than to the Bank itself. Unlike Menendez, I 
consider that public investment has permanently and variously financed the 
peasant economy in the industry. The different degrees of commoditisation 
that government capital inflows have developed among peasants could cer-
tainly have influenced their political behaviour, but in a wide spectrum run-
ning from strictly 'proletarian' in character, to greater campesino orienta-
tion. I have tried to demonstrate that household economy in the henequen 
industry has flourished in a unique way which can only be understood in its 
own context. Although the Federal Government's agencies have tried to 
develop this economy by the use of their own decision-making power, the 
peasants have actually been the ones who, by adopting defensive positions 
(proletarian and/or campesino) against public intervention, have been 
responsible for the pattern of its development. 
Furthermore, I believe that the character of those government pro-
grammes for the henequen industry discussed above tends to suggest that the 
government's promotion and development of the household economy has 
been constant, but that it has assumed a more accentuated form in periods 
of economic crisis than in those of up-turn. If any connection exists between 
the development of the household economy and government expenditure, I 
would be more inclined to argue that it is that, in periods of economic defla-
tion, the government has exercised greater control on the allocation of 
resources as a way of promoting certain sectors of the peasantry to the house-
hold economy category; in periods of expansion, however, government com-
mand has been relaxed, leaving the control of their resources to the produc-
ers themselves. 
Finally, it is also suggested that the possibility of creating the household 
economy among certain strata of the henequen peasantry, by appropriating 
government resources, cannot be fully understood without acknowledging 
that, despite government efforts to this end, such as the diversification prog-
rammes, the monocrop economy has not been dismantled. Muller (1980) 
and Brannon (1980) have tried to explain why, despite heavy and increasing 
losses, the Federal Government has not withdrawn its investment, or been 
successful in switching to other options, less costly than henequen. Without 
adopting the deterministic viewpoint of some geographers (Rowe, 1961, 
Hobbs, 1980), I consider that the quality and quantity of agronomic re-
sources available within and outside the henequen zone in Yucatan have 
demarcated the options within which capital (private or public) can chose to 
operate. The relationship between the agronomic endowment of Yucatan on 
the one hand, and the household economy financed with public money on 
the other, leaves few development options other than those elaborated by 
the henequeneros themselves. 
NOTES 
1. After re-privatisation of land tenure in 1955 the name of the institution (hereaf-
ter called the Bank) providing credit to ejidatarios was changed several times 
during the period 1955-1980. From 1955 to 1960, its name was Banco Nacional 
de Credito Ejidal (National Ejidal Credit Bank). Between 1961 and 1974 this 
was changed to Banco Agrario (Agrarian Bank) finally being taken over by 
Banco de Credito Rural Peninsular - Banrural - from 1975 to the present. 
Among Yucatan's specialists there is an agreement that the functions of these 
institutions have, to a large extent, remained the same, only the name being 
changed. 
2. Brannon (1980), p. 111. 
3. Brannon (1980), p. 185. Menendez holds a similar view on the same issue. See 
Menendez (1981), p. 174. 
4. See Menendez (1981), p. 175. 
5. A detailed analysis of the household economy in the case of the henequen indus-
try is presented in Escalante (1986). 
6. The different strategies which peasants use to obtain government resources is 
analysed in Escalante (1986). 
7. On the one hand, Lara y Lara (n.d.) and Pasos Peniche (1951) take the view that 
HedeYu was an institution which was fairer to ejidatarios than the one which 
replaced it, whereas Brannon (1980) and Menendez (1981) criticise HedeYu. 
8. This meant the establishment of monopoly control on the side of demand for 
raw fibre by the government. 
9. Yields for private producers have also been estimated to be higher than for 
ejidatarios. See Brannon (1980), p. 106. 
It should be noticed that calculations are made from 1956 onwards since, in 
my view, producers started reacting in economic terms to the reprivatisation 
process one year after it actually took place. However, if estimates are made 
taking into account 1955 output levels the results point towards a very different 
conclusion. This is to say that the ejidal sector would be reacting more positively 
to the re-privatisation than private producers. 
10. We must remember that in 1942 pequenos propietarios (i.e., former hacen-
dados) got back ownership of the decorticating mills expropriated from them in 
1938. 
11. Private producers (i.e., pequenos propietarios and parcelarios) did not receive 
official credit for henequen activities until 1918. They founded their own organi-
sations to do so (Union de Credito Agricola y Ganadero in 1964 and Union de 
Parcelarios respectively).. 
12. See Escalante (1986), for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
13. As demonstrated in Escalante (1986) larger credit advances were given to them 
as productivity and output levels declined. 
















The figures mentioned include Federal and local government expenditure. This 
is because the local government budget was also financed by the Federal Gov-
ernment. 
If we compare Zamora Millan's data for government expenditure with the 
Bank's, we shall notice that the latter, which are only for henequen, are much 
larger than the former, which include total Federal Government expenditure in 
Yucatan. It is my view that Zamora Millan does not take into account in his esti-
mates what was devoted to the henequen industry by the government. See Zam-
ora Millan (1961), pp. 44, 52-63. 
Private investment after agrarian reform has been directed primarily towards 
commerce and services, cattle raising, and agriculture (in that order). See Zam-
ora Millan (1961), p. 49. 
Non-recuperated credits came to be considered by both the Bank and 
ejidatarios as either irrecuperable or subsidies. 
See note 9. 
After agrarian reform in 1937, the increasing number of ejidatarios in henequen 
cultivation was promoted by both the increasing amount of government 
resources deployed in the activity relative to other agricultural non-henequen 
programmes in Yucatan, and the registration of more people than the Federal 
Agrarian Law permits. 
Although data to compare production costs with export prices for the period 
1955-63 are not available, an enquiry on the situation of the henequen industry 
in 1962 carried out by a government commission reported that differences bet-
ween them were considerable. See Loret de Mola and Pasos Peniche (1962). 
Parcelario growers did not receive any financial aid from the government. 
The proposal did not exclude the continuation of provision of credit by the 
Bank to the new proposed private ejidatario holders. 
Peasants' representatives disagreed with the proposal and instead they asked 
for lower interest rates for the Bank's loans, more credit, and definite resolution 
on some land-distribution cases still pending Federal Government approval. 
See Loret de Mola and Pasos Peniche (1962). 
Although the precise number of ejidatarios becoming parcelarios is not availa-
ble, according to observations during fieldwork this is a growing phenomenon. 
The present number of parcelarios is not exact. Brannon (p. 95) mentions that 
there are 10,000. Vera (p.42) argues that there are 15,000. Menendez says there 
are 12,000. Menendez (1981, p. 175) and Villanueva and Rubio (p. 73) calculate 
that there are 11,000. 
In some ejidos the privatisation process has encompassed henequen cultivated 
lands. A detailed discussion of this phenomenon and other ejidatarios' uses of 
government subsidies to develop non-henequen alternatives for survival was 
included in Escalante (1986). 
Alternative activities to henequen undertaken by ejidatarios somehow con-
nected with the use of government credit may vary according to the levels of cre-
dit provided to them by the Bank, political influence within the ejido, family-
labour availability etc. For a detailed discussion of these issues based on a 
survey carried out on henequen ejidatario growers, see Escalante (1986). 
29. This process may be in accordance with Lipton's Urban-Bias Theory. See Lip-
ton (1977). 
30. In 1897 Yucatan's government provided financial aid to La Industrial's owners 
to re-initiate production. A similar action was taken by Alvarado in 1916, and by 
Carrillo Puerto in 1922. See Brannon (1980), p. 42 and Joseph (1982), pp. 146, 
247. 
31. Another factor was that US cordage manufacturers could not obtain raw 
fibre from their Asian suppliers (i.e. the Philippines). See Brannon (1980), 
p. 122. 
32. Unlike Brannon and Lara y Lara, Echeagaray (1956) argues that the cordage 
mills' crisis was mainly provoked by HedeYu for two reasons. First, HedeYu did 
not supply cordage mills with as much fibre as they required, and second, fibre-
process costs for internal buyers were higher than for HedeYu's overseas con-
sumers. These arguments contradict the point that HedeYu was subsidising cor-
dage mills. See Echeagaray (1956), p. 62. 
33. Cordeleros de Mexico replaced another similar organisation called Asociacion 
de Productores de Artefactos de Henequen founded in 1950 by cordage mill-
owners. 
34. A study by Banrural points out that the decline of external demand since the 
war was somewhat compensated by the development of Mexico's agricultural 
sector which started providing increasing orders to the henequen manufactur-
ing industry. See Banrural (1980), p. 21. 
35. Brannon argues that this happened because Canadian capital was to take over 
the industry providing a 90 million dollar loan to millowners. This, he notes, was 
seen as a serious threat to Federal Government Involvement in the henequen 
industry and to the well-being of Yucatan's people as a whole. See Brannon 
(1980), p. 131. 
36. In 1962, the Ley de Saturacion de las Fibras Duras was enacted by the Federal 
Government to protect Cordemex from internal and external competition. This 
law allowed Cordemex to be the sole producer of henequen manufactured 
goods, and though raw fibre exports were not forbidden (until 1974), internal 
needs had to be met before exports could start. Imports of sisal-fibre were also 
prohibited. 
37. Despite the fact that both the Bank and Cordemex were Federal Government 
agencies in Yucatan, political rivalry between the two would develop over time. 
Disagreements between these institutions created important economic prob-
lems in the industry. 
38. Menendez argues that the Federal Government overpaid by twice as much as 
the real value of Cordemex's assets. Menendez (1964), Ch. IX. 
39. Poor quality control was one of the major obstacles the private Yucatecan indus-
try had faced during the forties and fifties. Complaints by buyers were so fre-
quent that the reputation of exploiting buyers was acquired. Millowners 
blamed HedeYu for this, arguing that the latter used to sell them low quality 
fibre. Echeagaray (1956), p. 62. 















mills was so diverse that production costs amongst them may vary by as much 
as 300 percent. Vera (1981), p. 52. 
See Escalante (1986). 
See Echeverria (1981), Ch. 5. 
Although it is widely known amongst Yucatecans and observers that little coop-
eration and coordination have existed or exist between the Bank and Cor-
demex, and rivalry between then has been allowed to develop and be resolved 
with almost no Federal Government intervention, in certain conjunctures the 
Federal Government's decisions are adopted by both institutions. 
Output rose as a consequence of favourable prices in the market provoked by 
uncertainty in its supply-side by African sisal-producers (i.e., Tanzania and 
Kenya). During the sixties these countries were involved in political struggles 
to gain their independence. 
As a way of preventing shortages, buyers acquired large stocks which in the 
long run oversupplied the market and lowered prices and demand as well. 
It is also interesting to note the decrease of private producers' share of the total 
output. Authors like Brannon (1980) and Vera (1981) coincide in their argument 
that this decrease may confirm the constant withdrawal of former hacendados 
from henequen cultivation to other activities, such as commerce, tourism, and 
the cordage industry. 
The 3.6 percent decrease in investment in the henequen agricultural sector is 
underestimated since figures are in current prices. Because an adequate 
implicit deflator index is not available for deflating public investment data, an 
accurate measurement cannot be given. However, taking into account that 
inflation during the period was very low, my estimate is that investment by the 
Bank went down in real terms by 5 percent. 
Data available based on Banco de Mexico's estimates, but which greatly conflict 
with other sources, nevertheless show that the average rate of growth of Yuca-
tan's agricultural sector as a whole decreased from 7.6 percent (1950-1960) to 
2.5 percent between 1960-1970. On the other hand, following the same 
economic indicators, industrial activities' average rate of growth rose from 3.9 
percent (1950-1960) to 6.1 percent (1960-1970). Banrural (1980), Appendix. 
According to Rubio and Villanueva, these two political mobilisations and their 
character demonstrate the proletarianisation process taking place among hene-
quen growers. Rubio and Villanueva (1979). 
Menendez mentions that in 1963, 13 million pesos were spent on unnecessary 
weedings. Menendez (1964), p. 262. 
See Pasos Peniche (1967), pp. 9-10,12,19 and Villanueva (1982), p. 9. 
See Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1972) pp. 30, 208. 
For Brannon, this change in policy by the government was due to the need to 
counteract growing political opposition to the PRI-Government formula which 
has ruled Mexico for more than forty years. However, this argument seems to 
be unsatisfactory since such political opposition never involved henequen peas-
ants. It was more a middle class urban phenomenon particularly concentrated 
in Merida (Yucatan's capital state). Brannon (1980), pp. 177-9. 
According to Menendez, due to the fact that in 1962 Cordemex's profits were as 
high as 30 million pesos, and profits of 100 million pesos were expected to be 
generated in the near future, forecasts were very optimistic. Menendez (1964), 
p. 163. 
54. See Brannon (1980), p. 157. 
55. The raw material for the production of cables, sacks, etc., made of synthetic 
fibres is a petrochemical product called polyprophiline. 
56. It is also recognised that the cordage industry, using synthetics as a source of raw 
material, has a better elastic price response to changes in levels of demand than 
natural hard-fibre manufacturers have. Furthermore, changes in the level of 
demand can be met more quickly because there is no dependence on long 
maturing agricultural sources for raw material. 
57. A complete description of all henequen manufactured goods and their uses is 
given in Escalante (1986). 
58. See Brannon (1980), p. 148. 
59. Figures for 1970 exports do not accord with Cordemex's own statistics. See 
Informe de SeisAhos de Labores, 1970-1976, Cordemex (1976). 
60. In 1970 the FAO tried to negotiate with the main natural hard-fibre manufactur-
ers the establishment of production quotas per country as a mechanism to avoid 
oversupply and price drops. Its efforts, however, were unsuccessful. 
61. See Vera (1979), p. 22. 
62. Menendez's data qualify this argument since they show that at least until 1965 
the relationship between international prices and Cordemex's average price-
costs produced a profit margin for the firm. Menendez (1964), pp. 171-4, 
282-3, 314-5. 
63. This was possible because of the monopoly control of the domestic market 
granted to Cordemex by the Federal Government. 
64. See Brannon (1980), p. 151. 
65. In 1971 Cordemex had established eleven decorticating mills throughout the 
henequen zone, and in 1973 four other plants with new technological innova-
tions were put into operation. Cordemex (May, 1977). 
66. By 1962, the Bank had acquired 40 rasping plants from former hacendados in 
which ejidos' leaves were defibrated. In 1976 these plants were sold to 
ejidatarios with the Bank's credits. See Banrural (1976). 
67. According to the data available 10.3 million pesos were given to parcelarios in 
subsidies. See Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1972), p.30, 
and Echeverria (1982), p. 125. 
68. See Vera (1981), p. 42. 
69. See Whitehead (1979). 
70. Despite the fact that ejidatario ownership was to be the rule, the actual function-
ing of these enterprises and ejidatarios' managerial control over them was never 
specified. 
71. The Confederacion Nacional Campesina -CNC (National Peasant Confedera-















political organisations into Cardenas' newly created political party PRM (PRI's 
predecessor). 
A detailed account of Yucatan's balance of payments constraints is provided in 
Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1972), pp. 45, 48-60. It 
should be acknowledged, however, that these data do not consider henequen 
export values in their calculations. If that had been the case, the deficit would 
still prevail, but would be much lower. This is important since there is a view-
point which maintains that subsidies Yucatan obtains from the Federal Govern-
ment are largely devoted to imports rather than investment. Although this argu-
ment may hold to a certain extent, to suggest this is the case entirely is mislead-
ing. See Liga de Economistas Revolutionaries de Yucatan (Conference Paper, 
n.d). 
Non-henequen activities were chosen taking into consideration the agronomic 
resources of these areas which would permit production at competitive prices 
and the ability to export part of the output as much as to sell it in Yucatan, 
This estimate was made on the basis of 70,000 henequen ejidatarios registered 
in 1973. 
Cardenas's 1937 Agrarian Decrees granted ejidatarios ownership of raw fibre, 
but also of henequen sub-profits. However, this regulation was seldom 
respected by plant owners. 
Raw fibre represents only 5 percent of a henequen leaf's total weight. See Sec-
retaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1980), p. 11. 
Because of Cordemex's entry into the activity of henequen leaf processing, 
former hacendados were affected since Cordemex started processing par-
celarios' output which in the past had been controlled by the hacendados. 
Officially and unofficially some ejidos took their leaves to be rasped at former 
hacendados' plants. When ejidatarios' leaves were smuggled to these plants, 
they were paid better prices than the Bank's. Former hacendados could afford 
it since, with that raw fibre, they could enhance supplies to their own cordage 
mills which had started competing with Cordemex during the 1970s. 
Training for 325 ejidatarios in Mexico, and 25 in Tanzania, on the functioning of 
the plants was carried out by the Federal Government. 
Something similar happened during the existence of HedeYu. Its administra-
tive staff tried to organise a union and peasants (ejidatarios) were told by 
HedeYu's top officials that a union could not be admitted since HedeYu was 
owned by ejidatarios and was not a private entrepreneur. 
See Banrural (1977), p. 101 and Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hid-
raulicos (1980). 
Cordemex's accumulated losses from 1968 to 1973 were 140.8 million pesos. See 
Echeverria (1981), p. 142. 
In 1970, Cordemex and its industrial labour force agreed on a set of very favour-
able working conditions. The most relevant one was that regardless of levels of 
production, workers could not be laid off by the firm without proper compensa-
tion. 
The effects of the bonanza period in the agricultural sector was overcutting 
of leaves. The consequence of this was felt some years later after lowering 
productivity levels even further. 
85. In 1975, throughout Cordemex's industrial mills in Yucatan and in other states 
(e.g., Jalisco and Tamaulipas), two thousand workers had to be made redun-
dant. Eight hundred of them were working in Yucatan's mills. 
86. See Banrural (1977), p. 2. 
87. Another study (Banrural, 1977) forecast that unless an intensive programme of 
new sowings was undertaken, by 1985 ejidatarios' raw fibre output would have 
diminished by as much as 35,000 tons. The consequence of this for the industrial 
sector of the industry (i.e., mainly Cordemex) would be disastrous. 
The enlargement of the cultivation area was also seen as necessary since 
demand for henequen manufactured goods, and by consequence raw fibre as 
well, was expected to rise. The considerations were, on the one hand, that oil 
prices would continue rising thus eroding the price competitiveness of synthe-
tics, and on the other, that sisal producers (because of labour shortages in the 
case of Brazil and the need to devote more land to the production of food in the 
case of Tanzania) would reduce their supplies to international markets. Both 
phenomena would work in favour of henequen. See Banrural (1977), p. 92. 
88. This alternative, displacing ejidatarios to non-henequen activities, was chosen 
in replacement of the previous plan of encouraging migration out of the hene-
quen zone to other areas of Yucatan, and to the neighbouring States of Cam-
peche and Quintana Roo. 
For this change in policy two reasons were adduced. First, the migration alter-
native was very expensive, and second, it did not work. Family links, the availa-
bility of government money and a good communications network in the Penin-
sula usually resulted in them going back to where they had been moved from in 
the first place. This time the diversification programme would be encouraged 
within the henequen zone. For that purpose 18,000 hectares of new cleared land 
would be sown with maize and beans. 
89. The outcome of the commission's enquiries was that of the original 30,000 
ejidatarios to be deleted from the Bank's records, only 20,000 were finally con-
sidered to be ineligible for credit provision. See Banrural (n.d.). 
90. See Banrural (1980). 
91. Muller argues that due to the fact that in Yucatan there is widespread househol-
ders' production for self-consumption GDP measurements are usually under-
estimated by about 20 percent. See Muller (1980), p. 12. 
92. In 1980 plant to produce concentrated orange juice to be exported to the United 
States was built in the South of Yucatan. See Villanueva (1982), p. 34. 
93. For data about the volume of sales see Yucatan: Historia y Economia 5: 28 
(1981), p. 93. For data about output value see Muller (1980), table 7. 
94. See Vera (1979), table 7. 
95. These cordage mills have come to be called Cordelerias Piratas (Illegal Cordage 
Mills). 
96. See Vera (1981), p. 56. 
97. In 1979, Cordemex's labour force was reduced to 5,000 workers as compared 
to 6,991 working for it in 1978. See Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos 
Hidraulicos (1980), p. 52. 
98. See Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos (1980), p. 52 and Muller 
(1980), p. 23. 
99. Import of raw fibre has been considered by Cordemex. For example, as the pro-
ject to establish a factory in Tanzania had to be scrapped because of the coun-
try's financial difficulties, Cordemex was negotiating its shares to be paid in 
kind (i.e., raw fibre) which could be manufactured at its plants in Yucatan. 
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